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NOTE
OSAGE NATION V. IRBY: THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DISREGARDS LEGAL PRECEDENT TO STRIP OSAGE
COUNTY OF ITS RESERVATION STATUS
Barbara Moschovidis *
It seemed to the Major that the Indian would never be left alone
to work out his own destiny; it seemed to him that until the last
foot of Indian land had fallen into the hands of the land-greedy
hordes there would be chaos.'
I. Introduction
Osage County, Oklahoma, once the exclusive domain of the Osage
Nation's reservation, today has a population that is only 3.5% Osage
Indian.2 After displacing the Osage Indians from their home in Kansas and
abruptly resettling them in Indian Territory, the federal government has
persistently encroached on Osage land until little remained in tribal hands.
Of the 1.4 million acres that once constituted the Osage Reservation, less
than 0.04% remains in restricted tribal ownership. In Osage Nation v.
Irby, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took one further step to deprive the
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Sincere thanks to
Professor Taiawagi Helton for his thoughtful substantive suggestions and for opening my
eyes to the field of Indian law. I also thank Professors Gail Mullins and Michelle Johnson,
whose guidance and encouragement have made me a better writer, and who have made the
journey fun. I owe a debt of gratitude to Crystal Masterson, who has nurtured this idea from
the start and provided invaluable insight and support throughout the writing process. And
finally, special thanks to Zissis and Maureen Moschovidis, without whom nothing would be
possible.
1. JOHN JOSEPH MATHEWS, WAH'KoN-TAH: THE OSAGE AND THE WHITE MAN's ROAD
130 (1981) [hereinafter MATHEWS, WAH'KoN-TAH].
2. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1127 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3056 (2011).
3. Id. These land statistics are as of 2000. Restricted ownership refers to the way in
which tribes traditionally hold their reservation lands, with the federal government owning
the underlying fee title and the tribes retaining rights of use and occupancy. See Katheleen
R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land Consolidation Act,
85 IOWA L. REv. 595, 602-03 (2000) (describing restricted ownership as "tribal use at federal
sufferance" and noting that "discovery conferred fee title, and, thus, transferability, upon the
United States, subject only to tribal rights of use and occupancy which were extinguishable
by federal conquest or purchase").
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Osage Nation of its tribal landholdings. Disregarding the canons of
construction - mandatory rules of statutory interpretation for issues
involving Indians - the court ruled that the Osage Reservation has been
disestablished.
This note argues that the Tenth Circuit's Osage Nation v. Irby decision
incorrectly and unjustly stripped Osage County of its status as Indian
Country. The court adhered to a line of authority that misapplies the
relevant standard for finding diminishment or disestablishment of a
reservation, ignores rules of construction for statutes regarding Indian
tribes, and engages in increasingly results-oriented judicial activism. As a
result of the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Osage Nation has been deprived
of one of the fundamental aspects of its sovereignty - exemption from state
taxation on reservation lands.4 After Irby, Osage tribe members who reside
in Osage County and are employed by the Osage Nation are subject to state
taxation of their income.'
The Tenth Circuit purports to adhere to Solem v. Bartlett's6 test for
ascertaining congressional intent to disestablish or diminish a reservation.7
The Court, however, assigns improper weight to many of the test's factors,
largely ignores allotment and assimilation's impact on the Osage Nation in
Oklahoma, and disregards the canon of construction requiring that
ambiguities regarding congressional intent be construed in favor of the
continued existence of the Osage Reservation.8
Part II of this note reviews the creation and subsequent allotment of the
Osage Reservation in present-day Oklahoma, the guiding principles of
federal Indian law that (until recently) have governed a court's inquiry into
diminishment or disestablishment, and the Supreme Court's recent trend
away from these principles and toward a judicial-activist and results-
4. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995) ("[W]hen a
State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian
country ... we have employed . . . a more categorical approach: absent cession of
jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, . . . a State is without power to tax
reservation lands and reservation Indians.") (internal quotation marks omitted). For a
general overview of tribes' exemption from state taxation, see Scott A. Taylor, State
Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within Reservation Boundaries:
Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
55 (1998-1999).
5. See generally Irby, 597 F.3d 1117.
6. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
7. This note discusses Solem v. Bartlett's test in Part II.B.2.




oriented approach. Part III summarizes the factual and procedural
background giving rise to Osage Nation v. Irby and discusses the Tenth
Circuit's flawed legal analysis and disregard of established precedent. Part
IV argues that courts deciding questions of diminishment or
disestablishment should return to a strict application of Solem v. Bartlett's
three-tiered analytical framework. Courts should weigh each factor
according to the hierarchy of probative evidence explicitly established in
Solem. The presence or absence of explicit statutory language should be
more persuasive than the context in which the act was passed or the events
occurring after its passage. Moreover, in the event of any ambiguity, courts
should apply the canons of construction to favor the continuation of Indian
reservations. This note concludes in Part V.
II. Law Before the Case
A. The Osage Nation
In 1870, the federal government removed the Great and Little Osage
Indians from their home in Kansas.9 The United States sold the Osage
Tribe's Kansas territory and used the proceeds to purchase from the
Cherokee Tribe a new plot of land in Indian Territory.' 0 In 1872, Congress
set aside this tract of land "to provide [the] Osage tribe of Indians with a
reservation . . . ."" The Congressional Act of June 5, 1872 created the
Osage Reservation by recognizing and setting apart the territory "[b]ounded
on the east by the ninety-sixth meridian, on the south and west by the north
line of the Creek country and the main channel of the Arkansas river, and
on the north by the south line of the State of Kansas."12 Today, this tract of
land constitutes Osage County, the largest county in Oklahoma and the seat
of the Osage Nation.
In response to settlers' increased demand for property in Indian Territory
and the growing desire to merge Indian tribes into mainstream white
culture, Congress embarked on a policy era of allotment and assimilation,
largely marked by the passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887,13
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Act of June 5, 1872, ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228 ("An Act to confirm to the Great and
Little Osage Indians a Reservation in the Indian Territory.").
12. Id. at 229.
13. See Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 334, 339, 341-42, 348-
49, 381 (2006)) ("An Act to provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the
various reservations, and to extend the protection of the laws of the United States and the
191No. 1]
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commonly known as the Dawes Act. Despite the general trend toward
allotment and assimilation, however, the Osage Reservation was
specifically exempted from the Dawes Act.14  But exclusion from the
Dawes Act was not the only instance of unique federal treatment of the
Osage Tribe. For example, in 1907, when Congress passed the Oklahoma
Enabling Act in preparation for Oklahoma's admission to statehood, it
evinced congressional intent to treat the Osage Reservation as a tract of
land distinct from the rest of Oklahoma Territory."
In conjunction with the Oklahoma Enabling Act, Congress passed the
Osage Allotment Act of 1906,16 which Oklahoma alleges disestablished the
Osage Reservation.17  The Osage Allotment Act established the legal
membership of the Osage Nation and then provided for the division of tribal
lands among tribe members.' 8  Additionally, the Osage Allotment Act
severed the reservation land's mineral estate from its surface estate and
placed the mineral estate in trust for the Tribe. 9
Congress did not revisit the Osage Nation's membership or the status of
the Tribe's landholdings until 2004, when it passed An Act to Reaffirm the
Inherent Sovereign Rights of the Osage Tribe to Determine Its Membership
and Form of Government, which purported to clarify the Osage Allotment
Territories over the Indians, and for other purposes."). For an historical overview of the
General Allotment Act and its goals, see John D. Barton & Candace M. Barton, Jurisdiction
of Ute Reservation Lands, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 133, 139-40 (2001-2002).
14. 25 U.S.C. § 339 (2006). For an in-depth discussion of the Osage tribe's exemption
from the allotment policy, see Micah T. Zomer, Comment, Returning Sovereignty to the
Osage Nation: A Legislative Remedy Allowing the Osage to Determine Their Own
Membership and System of Government, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 257 (2007-2008).
15. See Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906) ("An Act To enable the
people of Oklahoma and of the Indian Territory to form a constitution and State government
and be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States . . . ."). The
Enabling Act directed that Oklahoma Territory be divided into 56 districts for the purpose of
electing delegates to serve on a constitutional convention, but particularly required that
"such apportionment shall include as one district the Osage Indian Reservation." Id. § 2.
The Act further directed that the Osage Reservation would constitute "a separate county,
and ... shall remain a separate county until the lands in the Osage Indian Reservation are
allotted in severalty and until changed by the legislature of Oklahoma ..... Id. § 21.
16. Osage Allotment Act, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 (1906) ("An Act For the division of the
lands and funds of the Osage Indians in Oklahoma Territory, and for other purposes.").
17. See Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 3056 (2011); Osage Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 260 F. App'x 13, 15
(10th Cir. 2007).
18. Osage Allotment Act § 2, 34 Stat. 539, 540-43 (1906).
19. Id. § 3.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss1/4
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Act.2 o While the Act acknowledges that the Osage Nation is based in
Pawhuska, Oklahoma, it nowhere refers to an existing Osage Reservation
and is silent as to whether Osage County is currently classified as such.2 1
The principal case addressed in this note, Osage Nation v. Irby, raises the
question whether the Osage Reservation was indeed disestablished by the
Oklahoma Enabling Act and the Osage Allotment Act of 1906, or whether
it remains intact as Indian Country today. Oklahoma's ability to levy state
income taxes on Osage tribe members employed by the Osage Nation and
living within Osage County turns on the resolution of this question.22
B. Guiding Principles ofLaw
1. Canons of Construction
The Indian law canons of construction provide special rules of statutory
interpretation for courts to employ in cases where an Indian tribe was a
party to a treaty or statute passed by Congress. The canons of construction
find their source in Indian tribes' status as pre-constitutional sovereigns and
the traditional trust relationship that has since developed between the
federal government and the tribes.23 Because of the relatively unequal
bargaining power between the Indian nations and the federal government at
the time many tribal agreements and treaties were written, as well as the
language barriers that likewise existed, the canons direct courts to "look
beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the Treaty."24
The canons of construction provide the foundation for the interpretation
of any text affecting Indian rights, and have been reaffirmed by federal
20. Act of Dec. 3, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-431, 118 Stat. 2609.
21. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3056 (2011).
22. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995); Okla.
Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991).
23. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN]. The trust relationship is a foundational principal of
federal Indian law, whereby the federal government acts in its fiduciary capacity as trustee
of the Indian tribes. As with traditional trusts, this relationship implies that the federal
government, as guardian of the Indian wards (or as trustee of the Indian beneficiaries), must
act in the tribes' best interests. For an historical overview of the trust relationship and its
parameters, see John Fredericks III, Indian Lands: Financing Indian Agriculture: Mortgaged
Indian Lands and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105, 107-15
(1988-1989).
24. COHEN, supra note 23, at 121.
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courts of appeal in numerous recent opinions. 25 The canons take operative
effect, however, only when the plain text of a document is unclear.26 The
canons of construction have particular importance for statutes passed during
the allotment and assimilation era of federal Indian policy because
congressional intent regarding the future of Indian reservations was itself
unclear at the time.27
The first canon of construction requires courts to liberally construe
treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders in the light most
favorable to the tribes.28 Likewise, it directs courts to resolve any textual
ambiguities in favor of the Indians. 29 This rule of interpretation recognizes
that agreements between the federal government and the tribes were not
negotiated at arm's length and that, much like contracts of adhesion, tribes
often had no choice but to accept the terms of an agreement as offered.3 0
The second canon of construction requires courts to construe treaties,
statutes, and agreements as the Indians themselves would have understood
them at the time they were written.3 1 This rule of interpretation takes into
account the language barrier that characterized negotiations, as well as the
interpretational shortcomings between English and native languages.32
The third and final canon of construction requires that indigenous
property rights be preserved absent clear and unambiguous congressional
intent to the contrary.33 In the context of determining whether an Indian
reservation has been diminished or disestablished, this rule of construction
should carry special force.
2. Solem v. Bartlett
Solem v. Bartlett is the landmark 1984 Supreme Court opinion that
merged the holdings of numerous diminishment and disestablishment cases
into one "fairly clean" analytical framework.34 The purpose of the Solem
25. See, e.g., Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 1262, 1266 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); HRI, Inc. v. E.P.A., 198 F.3d 1224, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000).
26. Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe, 515 F.3d at 1266 n.7.
27. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1984).
28. COHEN, supra note 23, at 119.
29. Id.
30. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long a
Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 617-18 (1975).
31. COHEN, supra note 23, at 119-20.
32. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 30, at 610-11.
33. COHEN, supra note 23, at 120.




framework is to ascertain whether Congress intended to diminish or
disestablish a particular Indian reservation." Courts faced with this
question are directed to consider three factors, arranged in a hierarchy of
their probative value as to congressional intent: (1) the statutory language
employed by Congress to open reservation lands, (2) the circumstances
surrounding the passage of a particular act, and (3) the subsequent
demographic history and land tenure patterns of the opened lands.
Solem v. Bartlett came before the Supreme Court after John Bartlett, a
Cheyenne River Sioux tribe member, pleaded guilty to and was convicted
of attempted rape in South Dakota state court.37 While serving time in the
state penitentiary, Bartlett sought federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
38that he committed the offense on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.
Bartlett argued that despite a congressional act opening portions of the land
to non-Indian settlement, the Reservation remained Indian Country, and
was therefore beyond South Dakota's criminal jurisdiction.39
Before laying out the three-tiered framework for finding diminishment or
disestablishment, Justice Marshall acknowledged the historical backdrop of
allotment and assimilation policy that contextualized many of the acts
opening reservations to non-Indian settlement. The Solem decision
recognized that at the time that Congress passed most surplus land and
allotment acts, it simply did not foresee the continuing existence of Indian
reservations.40 Congress believed that, within one generation, Indians
would fully assimilate into "traditional" American society, eliminating the
need for a reservation system.4' In light of these beliefs, "Congress
naturally failed to be meticulous in clarifying whether a particular piece of
legislation formally sliced a certain parcel of land off one reservation."42
While admitting that Congress may have been less than meticulous in
drafting allotment era statutes, the Court nonetheless required meticulous
application of the canons of construction to those acts. Despite Congress's
expectation that the reservation system would fade into extinction (often
resulting in ambiguously drafted surplus land and allotment acts), the Solem
Court warned that it had "never been willing to extrapolate from this
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 465.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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expectation a specific congressional purpose of diminishing
reservations ... ."4 Instead, the Court emphasized that the effect of a
given act ultimately depends on the text itself and the circumstances
surrounding its passage," and not solely on the policy era in which it was
enacted.
Solem v. Bartlett's analytical framework begins with the premise that
only Congress has the power to diminish or disestablish a reservation.4 5
Moreover, congressional intent to do so must be "clearly evince[d]" before
a court will find that the boundaries of a reservation have indeed been
altered.4 6 The Solem Court identified three factors that may evince
congressional intent to diminish or disestablish a reservation. The Court
made clear, however, that courts applying these factors should not give
them equal weight, but should consider them in order of their probative
value.4 7 The Solem framework thus takes the form of a hierarchy, with
three tiers of probative evidence.
The first tier - and most probative evidence of intent to diminish or
disestablish - is the statutory language itself.48 The text of an act is most
likely to suggest diminishment or disestablishment where the act includes
"[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and
total surrender of all tribal interests .. .. ."4 Indeed, the existence of strong
language of cession and an unconditional commitment to pay for any
opened land creates an "almost insurmountable presumption" that Congress
intended to alter reservation bounds.so
The second tier of probative evidence focuses on the circumstances
surrounding a surplus land or allotment act's passage, including any events
demonstrating a contemporaneous understanding of diminishment or
disestablishment. This evidence includes the manner in which the act was
negotiated with the tribe and the contents of any legislative reports made to
Congress.5' To a lesser extent, courts may also consider events occurring
after the act's passage, including both Congress's and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs' treatment of the disputed land.52
43. Id. at 468-69.
44. Id. at 469.
45. Id. at 470.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 470-72.
48. Id. at 470.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 470-71.





In the final and least probative tier of evidence, courts may consider the
affected land's population demographics as an "additional clue" to indicate
what Congress foresaw when it passed the statute.s3 The Court noted,
however, that "subsequent demographic history is, of course, an unorthodox
and potentially unreliable method of statutory interpretation."5 4
After establishing the three-tiered framework, the Solem Court once
again stressed that the canons of construction govern the interpretation of a
statute purporting to diminish or disestablish an Indian reservation. The
Court maintained that "[w]hen both an act and its legislative history fail to
provide substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to
diminish Indian lands, [courts] are bound by our traditional solicitude for
the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place and that the
old reservation boundaries survived . ...
The Court applied the tripartite framework to conclude that the surplus
land act at issue did not diminish the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.56
The relevant act's absence of explicit language regarding cession of Indian
rights, coupled with the presence of textual provisions suggesting that the
disputed lands would continue to remain a part of the reservation, was
critical to the Court's holding." Because the Court could not find explicit
intent to disestablish in the act's text or the circumstances surrounding its
passage, it held that "[t]he presumption that Congress did not intend to
diminish the reservation therefore stands ....
C. The Court Strays from Faithful Application of Solem v. Bartlett
1. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe
In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,59 the Supreme Court applied the
Solem v. Bartlett test to determine whether an 1894 surplus land statute
diminished the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota.o In this case,
the Court began to stray from a strict application of the Solem framework.
Instead, the Court relied on historical circumstances to circumvent the plain
53. Id. at 471-72.
54. Id. at 472 n.13.
55. Id. at 472.
56. Id. at 481.
57. Id. at 473-74.
58. Id. at 481.
59. 522 U.S. 329 (1998). For a history of the dispute leading to the Supreme Court
decision (which the author aptly describes as "result oriented"), see Recent Developments,
23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 155, 155-57 (1998-1999).
60. See Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 333.
No. 1] 197
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language of the agreement purporting to diminish the reservation, failed to
adhere to the canons of construction regarding textual ambiguities, and
(mis)placed increased weight on the second and third tiers of probative
evidence.
An 1858 treaty between the United States and the Yankton Sioux Tribe
established the Yankton Sioux Reservation.6' The question of
diminishment arose after several counties in South Dakota formed a
recycling and waste management district for the purpose of constructing a
landfill.62 The site acquired for the landfill fell within the Yankton Sioux
Reservation's 1858 treaty boundaries. When the waste district applied for a
state permit for the landfill, the Yankton Tribe intervened on environmental
grounds."
The 1894 surplus land agreement between the Yankton Sioux and the
federal government provided that the Yankton Tribe would "cede, sell,
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and
interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the
reservation. . . ."6 The agreement further provided that the federal
government would compensate the Tribe with a single, fixed-sum payment
of $600,000.65 But the surplus land agreement also contained a saving
clause, stating that "[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed to
abrogate the treaty of April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux
Indians and the United States." 6 The Tribe thus argued that the saving
clause preserved the Yankton reservation boundaries as established in the
1858 treaty.67
The Yankton Court began its diminishment inquiry with the first tier of
the Solem framework: the text of the 1894 agreement. The Court concluded
that language of cession in the agreement and a sum-certain payment for the
opened lands gave rise to the "almost insurmountable" presumption of
diminishment first recognized in Solem.68
The Court strayed from faithful application of the Solem framework,
however, when it failed to give due credence to the agreement's saving
61. Id. at 333-34.
62. Id. at 340.
63. Id. at 340-41.
64. Id. at 337 n.1.
65. Id. at 338.
66. Id. at 337 n.1.
67. Id. at 345.





clause. Despite the Court's concession that statutory language is the most
probative evidence of congressional intent,6 9 the Court both failed to give
effect to the plain language of the saving clause and abandoned the canon
of construction requiring that statutory ambiguities be resolved in the tribe's
favor.
Instead of reading the 1894 surplus land act holistically and giving the
saving clause the "literal construction" that the Solem framework's first tier
demands, the Court relied on lower tiers of probative evidence, and
particularly the circumstances surrounding the agreement, to circumvent the
plain language of the saving clause. 70 The Court reasoned that the saving
clause's actual purpose was to preserve vital annuities of cash, food,
clothing, and firearms promised to the Yankton Tribe in its 1858 treaty with
the federal government.71  The Court explained: "[r]ather than read the
saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the agreement in which it
appears, we give it a 'sensible construction' . . . .72 But this construction
resulted in inconsistent interpretation of the agreement: the Court broadly
construed the land cession and sum-certain payment provisions to find
diminishment,7 3 but gave the saving clause a narrow reading, solely on the
basis of extra-textual circumstances.
When the Tribe raised the issue of statutory construction, the Court
summarily disposed of the argument. The Court maintained that "[t]he
principle according to which ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of
Indian tribes is not . . . 'a license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and
congressional intent."' 74 What the Court failed to address, however, was
that the Yankton Sioux surplus land agreement's saving clause was unique.
Instead of requiring that prior treaties remain in effect only to the extent
that they did not conflict with the subsequent agreement, the Yankton
saving clause plainly provided that nothing in the surplus land agreement
was to be construed to abrogate the earlier treaty terms. While this unique
clause's inclusion should provide a sufficiently clear expression of
69. Id. at 344.
70. Id. at 345-46.
71. Id. at 346.
72. Id. (citing United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 56 (1994)).
73. Id. at 349.
74. Id. (quoting DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975)).
75. A.J. Taylor, Note, A Lack of Trust: South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe and the
Abandonment of the Trust Doctrine in Reservation Diminishment Cases, 73 WASH. L. REV.
1163, 1183-84 (1998).
76. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 337 n.1.
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legislative and tribal intent to avoid diminishment altogether, the Court
refused to admit that its presence even rendered the agreement ambiguous.
The Supreme Court also departed from precedent in applying the second
prong of the Solem framework. When considering the circumstances
surrounding the surplus land agreement's passage, the Court readily
admitted that "the context of the Act is not so compelling that, standing
alone, it would indicate diminishment." 78  Yet the Court used the
circumstances under which the agreement was executed to buttress its
flawed first-prong analysis, concluding that the circumstances surrounding
passage did not rebut the presumption of diminishment arising from the
language of cession and the fixed-sum payment.79 This conclusion ignores
that the Court relied on second-tier contextual evidence to conduct its
statutory interpretation in the first place. Furthermore, in finding that the
Tribe understood that the 1894 agreement would diminish its reservation
lands, the Court relied exclusively on evidence from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs commissioners sent to negotiate with the Tribe.80
The Court's application of the Solem framework's third factor sealed the
Yankton Tribe's fate. In analyzing whether shifts in demographics and land
tenure patterns had resulted in de facto diminishment, the Court found the
disputed land to be "predominantly populated by non-Indians with only a
few surviving pockets of Indian allotments," despite an increase in the
Indian population in the area following the opening of a tribal casino.
Likewise, the Court noted that less than 10% of the 1858 reservation lands
remained in Indian ownership.8 2 As a final consideration, and in a prelude
to City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,83 the Court, relying on South
Dakota's consistent exercise of governmental authority over the land in
question, held that diminishment occurred.84
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe strikingly marks the Court's
departure from Solem v. Bartlett's three-tiered hierarchical framework.
Moreover, it illustrates the Court's increasing willingness to ignore the
Indian law canons of construction in questions of statutory interpretation,
witnessed yet again in Sherrill.
77. See id. at 349.
78. Id. at 351.
79. Id. at 351-52.
80. See id. at 352.
81. Id. at 356-57.
82. Id. at 356.
83. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).




2. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, the Oneida Indian Nation
contested paying property taxes to the City of Sherrill, New York." The
taxes were levied on property originally contained within the Oneida
Reservation in the early nineteenth century and reacquired by the Tribe in
the late 1990s.16 When the City of Sherrill attempted to evict the Oneida
Nation for its failure to pay property taxes assessed on the disputed lands,
the Tribe sought equitable relief prohibiting the present and future
imposition of property taxes.87 The Tribe alleged that with the open-market
purchase of once-tribal parcels of land, its aboriginal title and fee simple
title were unified. As a consequence of tribal sovereignty, the Tribe argued,
it was exempt from state taxation.
By introducing a laches analysis into Indian property claims and relying
almost exclusively on current demographics (while ignoring the historical
context that produced those demographics), the Supreme Court broke new
ground. In ruling against the Tribe, the Court noted that "[t]he long-
standing assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over
90% non-Indian, both in population and in land use, may create justifiable
expectations."8 The Court was particularly persuaded by New York's
exercise of jurisdiction over the Oneida land parcels for more than 200
years9o and the Tribe's alleged lapse in asserting its sovereign right to the
property, despite reacquiring the land only shortly before litigation.9' The
Court further emphasized the "impracticality of returning" the parcels of
land to sovereign Indian control.92
In his dissent, Justice Stevens recognized that "the Court has ventured
into legal territory that belongs to Congress. . . . [T]he Court has done what
only Congress may do - it has effectively proclaimed a diminishment of the
85. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202. For an in-depth critique of the Sherrill case, see Curtis
Berkey, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 373 (2005-2006).
86. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202.
87. Id. at 211-12.
88. Id. at 213-14.
89. Id. at 215 (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 215-16.
91. Id. at 216-17.
92. Id. at 219.
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Tribe's reservation and an abrogation of its elemental right to tax
immunity.
In both South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux and City of Sherill v. Oneida
Indian Nation, the Supreme Court ventured further and further from a
faithful application of the Solem v. Bartlett test. By conflating the first and
second prong inquiries and by placing increased weight on the less
probative second and third tiers of evidence, the Court invited the courts of
appeal to follow suit. The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Osage Nation v. Irby
thus joins this line of cases that misapplies the Solem test and strays from
the Indian law canons of construction.
III. Osage Nation v. Irby
A. Statement of the Case
In 1999, an Osage tribal member protested Oklahoma's assessment of
state income tax on her.94 She was employed by the Tribe on trust land, but
lived on fee land in Osage County, Oklahoma.95 The Oklahoma Tax
Commission applied 18 USC § 1151 and found that the tribal member did
not reside in Indian Country.96 The Commission concluded that because
93. Id. at 224-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In so remarking, Justice Stevens is
referencing Congress's exclusive "plenary power" over Indian affairs. William W. Quinn,
Jr., Federal Acknowledgement ofAmerican Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial Interposition,
and 25 C.F.R. § 83, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37,45 (1992) ("it is virtually axiomatic in Indian
law that the Congress has 'plenary power' concerning Indian affairs. This control over
American Indians and their affairs stems predominantly from the so-called 'Indian
Commerce Clause.' The single grant of power awarded Congress by the United States
Constitution authorizes Congress to 'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'); see also April L. Seibert, Note, Who
Defines Tribal Sovereignty? An Analysis of United States v. Lara, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
393, 393 (2003-2004) (citation omitted) (noting that tribes possess inherent sovereignty,
giving them the authority to "exercise powers free of the strictures of the Constitution unless
limited by treaty or Congress"); Aaron F.W. Meek, The Conflict Between State Tests of
Tribal Entity Immunity and the Congressional Policy of Indian Self-Determination, 35 AM.
INDiAN L. REV. 141, 147, 151 (2010-2011) ("[I]t is well settled that Congress is the supreme
arbiter in Indian affairs. Congressional power is exclusive and preemptive .. .. In addition
to its plenary nature, Congress's power is also supreme to all other branches of
government.").
94. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3056 (2011); Osage Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 260 F. App'x 13, 15
(10th Cir. 2007).




she did not reside in Indian Country, Oklahoma could assess state income
tax against her.97
The Osage Nation then filed suit against the State of Oklahoma and the
Oklahoma Tax Commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that: (1) the
Osage Nation's reservation remains intact as Indian Country and consists of
the entirety of Osage County, and (2) tribe members living in Osage County
are exempt from state taxation on income earned from employment by the
Osage Nation." The Osage Nation also sought injunctive relief preventing
the Oklahoma Tax Commission from assessing or collecting state income
tax from such tribal members.99
After the Osage Nation restructured its lawsuit to proceed against the
individual members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission under Ex parte
Young'sioo exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity,'01 the district
court considered the Oklahoma Tax Commission members' motion to
dismiss, which it converted to a motion for summary judgment.10 2 The
court found that the Osage Reservation had been disestablished more than
100 years ago,'03 and that income earned on non-trust land is
"presumptively subject to state taxes."'" The district court further found
that a ruling in favor of the Osage Nation would "contravene substantial
reliance interests" of the State in its ability to exercise sovereign authority
over the county in question.'0o The district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, finding that the Osage Reservation had been
disestablished.106 In the principal case discussed in this note, the Tenth
97. Id.
98. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 260 F. App'x at 15-16.
99. Id. at 16.
100. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
101. See Okla. Tax Comm'n, 260 F. App'x at 22; Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1255-56
(10th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment generally will not operate to bar suits so long
as they (i) seek only declaratory and injunctive relief rather than monetary damages for
alleged violations of federal law, and (ii) are aimed against state officers acting in their
official capacities, rather than against the State itself."). For an historical discussion of tribal
sovereign immunity, see Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The Evolution of
Tribal Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 99 (1999-2000).
102. Osage Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 597 F. Supp.2d 1250, 1252
(N.D. Okla. 2009), aff'd, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3056
(2011).
103. Id. at 1257.
104. Id. at 1264.
105. Id. at 1265-66.
106. Id. at 1266.
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Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding of
disestablishment. 107
B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that "[t]he pivotal issue in this case is whether
the Nation's reservation has been disestablished, not Oklahoma's tax
policies."os The United States Supreme Court has held that "only
Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its
boundaries," 09 and that its intent to do so must be "clear and plain."110
Citing Solem, the Tenth Circuit in Irby stated that "[i]t is well established
that Congress has the power to diminish or disestablish a reservation
unilaterally, although this will not be lightly inferred.""' In laying out the
guiding principles for discerning congressional intent, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that there is an initial presumption in favor of the continued
existence of a reservation."12
To determine whether Congress intended to disestablish the Osage
Reservation when it passed the Osage Allotment Act of 1906, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's three-tiered Solem v. Bartlett
framework. The Tenth Circuit summarized the test as follows: "In addition
to (1) explicit statutory language and (2) surrounding circumstances, the
Court looks to (3) 'subsequent events, including congressional action and
the demographic history of the opened lands, for clues to whether Congress
expected the reservation boundaries to be diminished."" 3  The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals treated each prong of the Solem framework in turn
before ultimately concluding that Congress intended to disestablish the
Osage Reservation when it enacted the Osage Allotment Act of 1906.114
107. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3056 (2011).
108. Id.
109. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984) ("Once a block of land is set aside for
an Indian Reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual plots within the
area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates
otherwise.") (emphasis added).
110. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (quoting United
States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1121-22.
112. Id. at 1122 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at 472).
113. Id. (quoting Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1395
(10th Cir. 1990)).




Under the first prong of the Solem framework, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the Osage Allotment Act did not "unambiguously suggest
diminishment or disestablishment of the Osage reservation.""' The Act did
not contain explicit language of cession, and because the entirety of the
Reservation was allotted to tribe members, it likewise did not provide sum-
certain payment for acquired lands."' 6  Moreover, the court noted the
presence of secondary factors identified in Solem favoring the continued
existence of a reservation." 7 Among these secondary factors were (1) the
Secretary of the Interior's reservation of lands for tribal purposes, (2) the
grant of individual allotments to tribal members before the land was opened
to non-Indian settlement, and (3) the reservation of mineral resources for
the tribe itself." 8
Under the second prong of the Solem framework, the Tenth Circuit
maintained that the circumstances surrounding the Osage Allotment Act's
passage "reflect[ed] clear congressional intent and Osage understanding
that the reservation would be disestablished.""' The court emphasized the
historical congressional policy of allotment and dissolution of reservations,
particularly those of the Oklahoma tribes.120 The court further relied on
historical Osage interest in negotiating allotment to support the proposition
that the Osage understood that the Act would terminate the Reservation.'21
The court was not persuaded by the Osage Nation's proffer of current
evidence indicating the continued existence of the Osage Reservation.122
Under the third prong of the Solem framework, the Tenth Circuit held
that the "dramatic shift" in Osage County's population demographics and
land ownership after allotment favored a finding of disestablishment.'2 1 In
particular, the court emphasized the State's exercise of jurisdiction over
115. Id. at 1124.
116. Id. at 1123-24.
117. Id. at 1123.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1124.
120. Id. Although at the time the Osage Allotment Act was enacted, federal Indian
policy toward Indians favored dissolution of reservations, federal policy has vacillated
throughout history, shifting from allotment and assimilation, to reorganization, to the
modem era of self-determination. For an historical overview of these shifting federal
policies in the context of Indian land claims, see Patrick W. Wandres, Note, Indian Land
Claims: Sherrill and the Impending Legacy of the Doctrine of Laches, 31 AM. INDLAN L.
REv. 131 (2006-2007).
121. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1125.
122. Id. at 1125-26.
123. Id at 1127.
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Osage County after the Act's passage, noting that the "jurisdictional
history ... demonstrates a practical acknowledgement that the Reservation
was diminished."l 24
Based on a superficial application of Solem's three-tiered framework, the
Tenth Circuit held "that the Osage Reservation has been disestablished by
Congress."l25 Having so held, the court did not reach the question of
whether "tribal members who reside and earn income on fee lands located
within the geographic boundaries of a reservation are exempt from state
income tax."12 6
C. The Tenth Circuit's Disregard ofEstablished Legal Precedent
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Osage Nation v. Irby not only strips the
Osage Nation of its reservation holdings, but also deprives the tribe of "a core
incident of tribal sovereignty"' 2 7 - tribal immunity from state income taxation
on Indian land.12 8 Beyond the specific implications for the Osage Nation, the
Tenth Circuit adds its holding to a series of cases disregarding the canons of
construction and increasingly replacing the textual inquiry into congressional
intent with an emphasis on less probative evidence tending to favor non-tribal
interests.
Although the Tenth Circuit properly selected the Solem v. Bartlett
framework to determine whether the Osage Reservation has been
disestablished, the court's ultimate holding is incorrect for a number of
reasons. Recall that the Solem test begins with an initial presumption
favoring the continued existence of a reservation absent clear and plain intent
to the contrary, followed by an examination of three factors in declining order
of importance: (1) the statutory language employed by Congress to open
reservation lands, (2) the circumstances surrounding the passage of a
particular act, and (3) the subsequent demographic history and land tenure
patterns of the opened lands.129 First, in its preliminary considerations, the
court failed to give adequate weight to the "presumption in favor of the
continued existence of a reservation," 3 o merely paying lip service to this
124. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 224 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
128. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1985).
129. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-72 (1984).




presumption without actually heeding it. Second, in inferring congressional
intent to disestablish the Osage Nation's reservation under Solem's first
prong, the court of appeals failed to accord appropriate weight to the Osage
Allotment Act's statutory text, which nowhere explicitly diminishes or
disestablishes the Osage Reservation and instead presents many factors that
the Supreme Court has identified as supporting the continued existence of an
Indian reservation. Finally, regarding the second and third Solem factors, the
Tenth Circuit rather selectively examined the circumstances surrounding the
Osage Allotment Act's passage and subsequent history, without giving due
consideration to the history of the Osage Nation in Oklahoma.
1. Preliminary Considerations: The Requirement of Clear Congressional
Intent and the Presumption in Favor of the Continued Existence of the
Osage Reservation
Before beginning its application of the Solem v. Bartlett framework to the
Osage Nation's claim against disestablishment, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals acknowledged that congressional intent to "disestablish a reservation
unilaterally . . . will not be lightly inferred."' 3 1  Rather, Supreme Court
precedent requires clear, if not explicit, congressional intent to support a
finding of diminishment or disestablishment. Despite the erroneous result in
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court there correctly stated that
"only Congress can alter the terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a
reservation, and its intent to do so must be 'clear and plain."'l 32 Likewise, in
United States v. Dion, the Supreme Court aptly noted that "in the absence of
explicit statement, 'the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be
lightly imputed to the Congress."" 33  The Dion Court further stated that
"Indian treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast aside," and that
"different standards" exist "for determining how such a clear and plain intent
must be demonstrated." 34
In addition to the heavy burden that a requirement of clear and plain
congressional intent imposes, the Supreme Court has established a
presumption in favor of the continued existence of an Indian reservation. In
Solem v. Bartlett, the Court stated that where both statutory text and
legislative history leave congressional intent unclear, it is "bound by [its]
traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not
131. Id at 1121-22.
132. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986)).
133. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739 (citations omitted).
134. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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take place and that the old reservation boundaries survived the opening."' 35
This language in Solem requires courts deciding questions of diminishment or
disestablishment to resolve any ambiguities regarding congressional intent in
favor of the tribe and the continued existence of the reservation. The Tenth
Circuit, however, gives only a cursory nod to the presumption in favor of the
continued existence of the Osage Reservation. In one short phrase, buried
within the text of a paragraph, the court of appeals admits that "there is a
presumption in favor of the continued existence of a reservation"l 36 and then
seemingly disposes of this presumption, without further consideration.
Neither the Oklahoma Enabling Act nor the Osage Allotment Act contains
language "clearly and plainly" disestablishing the Osage Reservation.
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding and events following the acts'
passage do not unequivocally suggest that the Osage Reservation's
disestablishment was either intended or understood. Despite these
ambiguities, discussed at greater length infra,'" the court of appeals failed to
apply the appropriate presumption in favor of the continuing existence of the
Osage Reservation. The Osage Allotment Act of 1906's text, as well as its
concurrent and subsequent understanding, simply do not present the
"substantial and compelling"" 8 evidence required to support a finding that
the Osage Reservation has been terminated. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals should have shown solicitude to the Osage Nation, heeding
the presumption favoring the continued existence of the Osage Reservation
and resolving the question presented in Osage Nation v. Irby in favor of the
tribe.
2. Solem's First Factor: The Statutory Language Employed by Congress
to Open Reservation Lands
To arrive at its holding in Irby, the Tenth Circuit shifted the weight
assigned to evidence under the Solem framework's hierarchical structure.
Under the first prong, the court failed to accord due consideration to the
absence of statutory language terminating the Osage Reservation, basing its
decision instead on ambiguous historical circumstances. The Tenth Circuit
also failed to give proper weight to the Solem Court's supplementary first-
prong factors that indicate congressional intent to preserve Indian Country
and point to the continued existence of the Osage Reservation.' 39
135. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 (1984).
136. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1122.
137. See infra notes 172-202 and accompanying text.
138. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1122.




In commencing its analysis of the first Solem factor, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that "[s]tatutory language is the most probative
evidence of congressional intent to disestablish or diminish a reservation."l40
The logical corollary of this principle is that the absence of clear statutory
language should carry equal probative weight in determining whether a
reservation has been disestablished or diminished. Because statutory
language best illustrates congressional intent - and as explicitly directed by
the Supreme Court itself - this prong of the Solem v. Bartlett framework
should be given the most weight in determining whether the Osage
Reservation continues to exist.
Although the Tenth Circuit did not give due credence to the absence of
language explicitly terminating the Osage Reservation in the Osage
Allotment Act, it did at least recognize the kind of language that would
accomplish that function with its presence. The Irby court noted that the
Supreme Court has found diminishment or disestablishment of a reservation
where the statutory language expressly references "cession or other language
evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests ... 141
Examples of explicit termination language include: "the Smith River
reservation is hereby discontinued,"1 42 "the same being a portion of the
Colville Indian Reservation ... is hereby, vacated and restored to the public
domain,"143 and "the reservation lines of the said Ponca and Otoe and
Missouria Indian reservations ... are hereby, abolished."'4
The Osage Allotment Act contains no similarly explicit statutory language
disestablishing the Osage Reservation. The Act merely states that "all lands
belonging to the Osage tribe of Indians in Oklahoma Territory . . . shall be
140. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1122-23.
141. Id. at 1123 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 470). In Solem v. Bartlett, the Supreme
Court stated that "[o]nce a block of land is set aside for an Indian reservation and no matter
what happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its
reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise." Solem, 465 U.S. at 470
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909)).
142. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 248, 15 Stat. 198, 221 (emphasis added) ("An Act making
Appropriations for the current and contingent Expenses of the Indian Department, and for
fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with various Indian Tribes for the Year ending thirtieth June,
eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, and for other Purposes.").
143. Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62, 63 (emphasis added) ("An act to provide
for the opening of a part of the Colville Reservation, in the State of Washington, and for
other purposes.").
144. Act of Apr. 21, 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-125, 33 Stat. 189, 218 (emphasis added) ("An
Act Making appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian Department
and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with various Indian tribes for the fiscal year ending June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred and five, and for other purposes.").
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divided among the members of said tribe . . . ."145 After existing tribe
members were given the opportunity to select three 160-acre allotments, the
remaining tribal lands were to be "divided as equally as practicable" among
the members of the tribe, keeping the entirety of the original Osage
Reservation in tribal hands.146 Recognizing that allotment and diminishment
are wholly separate, the Tenth Circuit admitted that "[t]he Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated . .. that allotment/opening of a reservation alone does not
diminish or terminate a reservation."l 47 But despite overtly acknowledging
the Supreme Court's direction, the Irby court's ultimate finding of
disestablishment (without a finding of explicit congressional intent to do so)
appears nonetheless to conflate allotment with disestablishment. Given that
Osage allotment was voluntary, exclusively among tribal members, and
allowed no lands to pass outside Osage control, this conflation is indeed
enigmatic.
Aside from the absence of explicit language disestablishing the
reservation, language in the Osage Allotment Act indicates a
contemporaneous understanding that the Osage Reservation would in fact
continue in existence after allotment and statehood. Congress refers to the
"Osage Reservation" several times throughout the course of the Act.
Specifically, section 4 of the Act states that "[t]here shall be set aside from
the royalties received from oil and gas not to exceed fifty thousand dollars
per annum ... for the support of the Osage Boarding School and for other
schools on the Osage Indian Reservation conducted or to be established and
conducted for the education of Osage children." 48 Section 6 of the Act also
alludes to the continued existence of the reservation, stating that "the lands,
moneys, and mineral interests ... of any deceased member of the Osage tribe
shall descend to his or her legal heirs, according to the laws of the Territory
of Oklahoma, or of the State in which said reservation may be hereinafter
incorporated. .. .",149 Rather than showing explicit intent to disestablish the
Osage Reservation, these references imply that the Osage Reservation would
continue to exist after Oklahoma joined the Union and indefinitely into the
future. The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Osage Nation v. Irby utterly fails to
note these textual indicators supporting the continued existence of the Osage
Reservation.
145. Osage Allotment Act, ch. 3572, § 2, 34 Stat. 539, 540 (1906).
146. Id. § 2, 34 Stat. at 541.
147. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3056 (2011).
148. Osage Allotment Act, § 4, 34 Stat. at 544 (emphasis added).




The manner of compensation for tribal lands allotted or opened to the
public for settlement may also provide evidence of Congress's intent
regarding the Osage Reservation.so One-time "sum-certain" payments often
indicate an intent to terminate the reservation status of a tract of land, while
"payment that is contingent on future sales usually indicates an intent not to
terminate."' 5 In its discussion of compensation, the court of appeals echoed
the Supreme Court, stating that "[e]xplicit language signifying an intent to
terminate a reservation combined with a sum-certain payment creates 'an
almost insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the tribe's
reservation to be diminished."" 52 When the court applied the rule, however,
it only briefly noted that the Osage Allotment Act contains no terms of
payment because the land was not intended to be sold or opened for
settlement. 53 It failed to consider that the absence of payment may itself be a
strong indicator against disestablishment or that the absence of terms
disposing of Osage lands to nonmembers is strong evidence that Congress
intended to leave the Osage Reservation intact.
In addition to the first prong's principal examination of the act's statutory
text to discern clear congressional intent to find diminishment or
disestablishment, the Supreme Court has laid out supplementary statutory
factors that support the continued existence of an Indian reservation under the
Solem framework's first prong. In Irby, the Tenth Circuit listed the
supplementary factors as follows: "(a) authorization for the Secretary of the
Interior to set aside lands for tribal purposes; (b) permission for tribal
members to obtain individual allotments before the land was officially
opened to non-Indian settlers; and (c) reservation of the mineral resources for
150. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1123.
151. Id. For instance, the Supreme Court held that an Indian Reservation remained in
existence where there was neither express statutory language regarding termination of the
reservation nor the promise of a "sum-certain" payment for tribal lands. Id. (citation
omitted).
152. Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984)).
153. Id. at 1123-24. After registered tribe members had their choice of three tracts of
land within the reservation, the remainder was to be equitably divided among the members
of the tribe. Osage Allotment Act, § 2, 34 Stat. at 541. The Act further stated that "the lands
herein provided for are set aside for the sole use and benefit of the individual members of the
tribe . . . ." Id. § 7, 34 Stat. at 545. Moreover, the right to execute deeds to any Osage lands
was placed within the sole authority of the principal chief of the Osage, subject to approval
by the Secretary of the Interior. Id. § 8. Although tribally executed deeds likely were not
within the Supreme Court's contemplation at the time it wrote the language, these deeds
nonetheless fall more in line with "payment that is contingent on future sales" (which
"usually indicates an intent not to terminate"), rather than sum-certain payments (which
often indicate an intent to terminate). See Irby, 597 F.3d at 1123.
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the tribe as a whole."' 5 4 The Osage Allotment Act of 1906 contains each of
these three elements, which further supports the conclusion that Congress
intended continuation of the Osage Reservation when the Act was passed.'55
Turning to the first supplementary factor, the Osage Allotment Act
expressly permits the Secretary of the Interior to set aside reservation land for
tribal purposes.156  It reserves lands on which the Secretary of the Interior
could erect buildings for both tribal and government uses.'57 The Act also
protects from allotment tracts of tribal land used for an Osage Boarding
School and for an Osage Nation cemetery. The sale of these lands was left to
the Tribe's discretion "under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of
the Interior may provide . . . ."'5s All of these textual references fit
seamlessly within the first supplementary factor's finding of "authorization
for the Secretary of the Interior to set aside lands for tribal purposes." 159 As a
result, they all support the continued existence of the Osage Reservation.
As for the second supplementary factor, which requires "permission for
tribal members to obtain individual allotments before the land was officially
opened to non-Indian settlers,"'60 the Osage Allotment Act fully allots the
Osage Reservation and nowhere permits settlement of reservation lands by
non-Osage settlers. 16 1 The Osage Allotment Act not only gave tribal
members permission "to obtain individual allotments before the land was
154. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1123 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at 474).
155. Id.
156. Osage Allotment Act, § 4, 34 Stat. at 540-43.
157. Id. § 2, 34 Stat. at 543 (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to sell the United
States Indian agent's office building, the Osage council building, and other government
buildings in Pawhuska "and with the proceeds he shall erect other suitable buildings for the
uses mentioned, on such sites as he may select. . .
158. Id.
159. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1123 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at 474).
160. Id (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at 474).
161. The Act explicitly states that "all lands belonging to the Osage tribe of Indians in
Oklahoma Territory, except as herein provided, shall be divided among the members of said
tribe . . . ." Osage Allotment Act, § 2, 34 Stat. at 540 (emphasis added). According to the
Act, each tribe member was to select three 160-acre tracts of land. Id. § 2, 34 Stat. at 540-
42. The Act contains special provisions for selecting land on behalf of minors or adults who
"fail[], refuse[], or (are] unable" to select their allotments. Id. § 2, 34 Stat. at 540-41
(providing that selections for adults and minors are to be made by the United States Indian
agent for the Tribe, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior). After each
recognized tribe member has made his or her three selections, the Act disposes of any
remaining lands by dividing them "as equally as practicable among said members by a
commission to be appointed to supervise the selection and division of said Osage lands." Id.




officially opened to non-Indian settlers" (as the second supplementary
statutory factor requires), 6 2 but, in fact, reserves all reservation lands to tribal
members, never opening it to non-Indian settlers at all.'63 As a result, the
Osage Allotment Act's language and effect not only satisfy the second
supplementary factor, but indeed surpass its mandate. Coupled with the lack
of explicit language of disestablishment, the retention of tribal ownership and
absence of non-Indian settlement on the Osage Reservation strongly support
its continued existence.
Finally, turning to the third supplementary statutory factor, which requires
"reservation of the mineral resources for the tribe as a whole,"'" the Osage
Allotment Act reserves to the Osage Tribe all oil, gas, coal, and mineral
rights associated with any of the allotted surface lands on the Reservation.ns
It provides that any leases for these mineral rights must be made by the
Osage Nation and that all royalties from such leases must be paid to the
Tribe.16 6 With all resource rights and royalties vested in the Tribe, the third
supplementary factor is easily satisfied, and, along with the first two
supplementary factors, evidences the continued existence of the Osage
Reservation.
After examining the Osage Allotment Act's language under Solem's
principal and supplementary factors, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
ultimately held that "the operative language of the statute does not
unambiguously suggest diminishment or disestablishment of the Osage
reservation."067Although the court of appeals is correct that the Act suggests
neither diminishment nor disestablishment, its analysis falls short. The court
of appeals simply stated that "neither the Osage Allotment Act nor the
Oklahoma Enabling Act contain express termination language." 68 The
Tenth Circuit utterly failed to discuss the Osage Allotment Act's textual
references to the Osage Reservation that imply the Reservation's continuing
existence. And while the court of appeals admitted that all three of the
supplementary statutory factors (which also evidence the continued existence
of the reservation) were present, it did not explore them in any depth.'69
162. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1123 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at 474).
163. Osage Allotment Act, § 2, 34 Stat. at 540-42.
164. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1123 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at 474).
165. Osage Allotment Act, § 3, 34 Stat. at 543-44.
166. Id.
167. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1124.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1123. Although the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Osage Allotment Act
is "unlike other allotment acts" that terminated the reservation status of tribal lands, the court
did not truly examine this difference and the evidence that supports it. Id.
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Under Solem's first prong analysis, the Tenth Circuit failed to place
sufficient weight on both the absence of statutory language expressly
terminating the Osage Reservation's status as Indian Country and the clear
presence of statutory factors that support its continued existence. Rather, the
Tenth Circuit summarily labeled the Act's language as ambiguous and
hastened to discuss the other prongs of the Solem v. Bartlett framework. 17 0
The court relied on less probative tiers of evidence to divine congressional
intent that is clearly absent in the Osage Allotment Act's text.'7' But as the
most indicative means to ascertain congressional intent, the Tenth Circuit
should have given the Solem v. Bartlett test's first prong the weight it
deserves. Only thereafter should the Irby court have turned to the Solem
framework's second and third tiers as a means of supplementing the primary
inquiry into the Act's language.
3. Solem's Second Factor: The Circumstances Surrounding the Act's
Passage
After holding that the Osage Allotment Act's language does not
unambiguously suggest the Osage Reservation's termination, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered Solem's second prong: the
circumstances under which the statute was passed. The Irby court stated:
If the statute is ambiguous, we turn to the circumstances
surrounding the passage of the act, in particular the manner in
which the transaction was negotiated and its legislative history, for
evidence of a contemporaneous understanding that the affected
reservation would be diminished or disestablished as a result of
the proposed legislation.172
The Supreme Court in Solem, on the other hand, required that the "events
surrounding the passage of a surplus land Act . . . unequivocally reveal a
widely held, contemporaneous understanding that the affected reservation
would shrink as a result of the proposed legislation. ... The connotative
difference in the courts' language reveals the Irby court's departure from the
Supreme Court's mandate. In examining the circumstances surrounding the
relevant act's passage, the Supreme Court's language suggests that courts
must find unequivocal, concrete evidence of a "contemporaneous
understanding that the affected reservation" would be disestablished "as a
170. See id. at 1124.
171. Id. at 1124-27.
172. Id. at 1124 (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984)).




result of the proposed legislation."l 74 The Tenth Circuit's language, on the
other hand, substantially lowers the evidentiary burden for a finding of
disestablishment by requiring only "evidence," without the exigency of the
Supreme Court's "unequivocal" requirement. Before the Irby court even
begins its second-prong analysis, its explicatory language, when compared to
that of the Supreme Court, already favors non-Indian interests.
But aside from its remiss explanation of Solem's second prong, the Irby
court did not closely examine the events leading up to the Act's negotiation
or its legislative history. Instead, the Tenth Circuit primarily relied on the
broad assertion that the Osage Allotment Act "was passed at a time where the
United States sought dissolution of Indian reservations, specifically the
Oklahoma tribes' reservations."'7s This assertion directly contradicts the
Supreme Court's statement in Solem that "we have never been willing to
extrapolate from th[e] expectation [that the reservation system would cease to
exist] a specific congressional purpose of diminishing reservations."
To support its holding, the Tenth Circuit largely relied on the fact that the
Five Civilized Tribes' lands were allotted and their reservations extinguished
in preparation for Oklahoma's statehood.'7 7 Although the court of appeals
acknowledged that the Osage Nation was not included in the Dawes
Commission's disestablishment of other reservations in Oklahoma,17 8 it failed
to acknowledge the Osage Nation's special history among the Oklahoma
tribes. 79
174. Id.
175. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1124.
176. Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69.
177. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1124.
178. Id.
179. In Wah'Kon-Tah: The Osage and the White Man's Road, author John Joseph
Mathews highlights the difference between the Osage Nation and the other Indian tribes in
Oklahoma Territory, in particular the Five Civilized Tribes. He remarks, "The Osages were
never included as the sixth 'civilized tribe."' MATHEWS, WAH'KoN-TAH, supra note 1, at
121. Moreover, Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law treats the Osage Tribe
individually in its discussion of the Oklahoma tribes, but treats the Five Civilized Tribes as a
collective group. No other Indian tribes with a presence in Oklahoma are separately
discussed. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 297. In another work on the Osage Nation, The
Osages: Children of the Middle Waters, John Joseph Mathews again emphasizes the
distinction between the Osage Allotment Act and other tribes' allotment acts:
The act of June 28, 1906, was called an "allotment act," but was not in the
sense that other acts individualizing tribal property were allotment acts. The
other tribes . . . certainly tired, disillusioned, and less resistant, accepted
individual allotment . .. on the urgings of the commissioners, who could hear
the politicians and the ever present Heavy Eyebrows shouting for more land.
The Osages, on the other hand, by the act would hold their land intact but not
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The Tenth Circuit asserted that in the wake of the Dawes Commission, the
Osage Nation "felt pressure having observed the Commission's activities
with respect to other tribes and '[flor several years, the Osage . .. ha[d] been
considering the question of asking the Government to divide its lands and
moneys among the members of the tribe."' 8 0  But the court of appeals
ignored that much of this pressure was applied by sources outside of the tribe.
In the years preceding the Act, the "pressure for allotment of the Osage
reservation steadily increased from the local white population, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and some mixed-blood Osage as well."' 8 ' In 1894, the federal
government sent the "Osage Commission" to Pawhuska, the heart of the
Osage Reservation, to discuss the possibility of allotment.18 2 A delegation of
full-blood Osages responded with a list of concerns regarding allotment: "the
Osage were not ready for allotment; . . . the Osage did not desire
allotment; ... they could not agree on how the land, in case of allotment, was
to be divided; [and] . . . there were individuals on the tribal roll
illegally ... .." With control of the Osages' governing body, the National
Council, in the hands of an anti-allotment faction, "the Bureau of Indian
Affairs ... played its trump card by abolishing the council." 84
After the Osage National Council was abolished, it became "obvious to all
concerned that allotment was just a matter of time, and that regardless of the
feeling of the Osage it was going to come." 85 The Osage Nation presented a
proposed allotment act to Congress in early 1906, and the Osage Allotment
Act was passed in June of that year.186 The court of appeals appeared to take
Osage "initiation" of and consent to allotment as prima facie evidence of a
contemporaneous understanding that the Osage Reservation would be
disestablished. The court made no closer inspection of how the Osage
political landscape was altered to pursue allotment.
communally . . . . They called their allotments wah-tha-do-bi, "can't-go-
beyond." There would be no "land run" into the Osage Reservation. . ..
JOHN JOSEPH MATHEWS, THE OSAGES: CHILDREN OF THE MIDDLE WATERS 772-73 (1982).
180. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1124 (quoting S. REP. No. 59-4210, at 1 (1906)).
181. 5 GARRICK ALAN BAILEY, CHANGES IN OSAGE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: 1673-1906, at




184. Id at 90.
185. Id.





The Tenth Circuit based much of its discussion of the Solem v. Bartlett
framework's second prong on skewed historical commentary about the nature
of tribal-government relations and the status of reservations in Oklahoma.
The court never carefully examined the record surrounding the Osage
Allotment Act's adoption, which provides evidence of an understanding that
the Osage Reservation would not be terminated.' For example, discussion
in the House of Representatives prior to the Act's passage indicates that there
was an understanding that a reservation relationship would continue between
the federal government and the Osage Nation.'8 8  Indeed, the Oklahoma
Constitution, ratified only shortly after the Osage Allotment Act's passage,
also indicates a contemporaneous understanding that the Osage Reservation
remained in existence.' 89 Later congressional decisions similarly evince an
understanding that Osage County was still tribal land.'90
The record before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Osage Nation v.
Irby simply did not present the unequivocal evidence of a contemporaneous
understanding favoring disestablishment that Solem v. Bartlett requires. In
truth, the record did not even show the Irby court's misarticulated evidentiary
standard of "evidence" (rather than unequivocal evidence). Noting a general
sentiment regarding federal Indian policy at the time the Act was passed
hardly qualifies as evidence regarding a specific tribe, particularly with such
compelling indications to the contrary. Without such evidence supporting a
contemporaneous understanding of disestablishment, the court of appeals
should have shown deference to the Osage Nation and the presumption in
favor of the continued existence of the Osage Reservation. After ignoring a
187. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted historian Francis Prucha, who wrote,
"The Indians of Oklahoma were an anomaly in Indian-white relations.... There are no
Indian reservations in Oklahoma.... [T]he reservation experience that was fundamental for
most Indian groups in the twentieth century was not part of Oklahoma Indian history." Id. at
1125 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit also cites Berlin B.
Chapman, who stated that "'[t]he last of [Oklahoma's] reservations to be dissolved by
allotments was that owned and occupied by the Osage.. . . " Id (citation omitted).
188. In debate on the House Floor, one representative stated that "[the Osage Indians] are
still in the hands of the Government for twenty-five years, the same as they are now, except
the land is segregated and each individual is given a certificate of his proportionate share."
59 CONG. REC. 7196, 7200 (1906) (statement of Rep. Curtis).
189. Article 17, section 8 states that "[tihe Osage Indian Reservation with its present
boundaries is hereby constituted one county to be known as Osage County ..... OKLA.
CONST. art. 17, § 8.
190. One such congressional act declared "that all of Osage County, Oklahoma, shall
hereafter be deemed to be Indian country within the meaning of the Acts of Congress
making it unlawful to introduce intoxicating liquors into the Indian country." Act of Mar. 2,
1917, ch. 146, § 17, 39 Stat. 969, 983.
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plethora of evidence supporting the Osage position under Solem's most
probative factor and then brushing aside any true analysis of Solem's second
most probative factor, the Irby court placed substantial weight on Solem's
least probative factor (and with a myopic, misguided analysis, at that),
disregarding the Supreme Court's directive.
4. Solem's Third Factor: The Subsequent Demographic History and Land
Tenure Patterns of the Opened Lands
The Solem framework's final prong for gleaning congressional intent
examines "subsequent events, including congressional action and the
demographic history of the opened lands, for clues to whether Congress
expected the reservation boundaries to be diminished."191 Courts look with
particular reference to the actions of Congress, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and local governing authorities.192  "Express recognition of the continued
existence of specific reservations by Congress in subsequent statutes, of
course, supports the continued existence of a reservation." 93  A state's
exercise of jurisdiction over an area formerly considered a reservation,
however, may support a finding of disestablishment.194
Although it articulates the third prong as examining both congressional
action and demographic history, the Tenth Circuit did not concentrate on
congressional action,195 but instead emphasized the Supreme Court's focus
on population demographics in making determinations regarding possible
disestablishment. In Solem v. Bartlett, the Court stated that "[w]here non-
191. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pittsburgh &
Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1990)).
192. Id. at 1126.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. The court of appeals failed to give weight to a number of congressional acts
recognizing the Osage Reservation's existence as late as 2004. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 24,
1942, ch. 640, § 3, 56 Stat. 1021, 1022 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 373c); Act of
May 11, 1938, ch. 198, § 6, 52 Stat. 347, 348; Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 398); Osage Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-431,
118 Stat. 2609 (2004). Likewise, it ignored that the Osage Tribe Liquor Control Ordinance,
certified by the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs in 2005, states that the Osage Nation's
jurisdiction extends to all Indian Country within the original bounds of the Osage
Reservation, as delineated in the Act of June 5, 1872. Osage Tribe Liquor Control
Ordinance, 70 Fed. Reg. 3054, 3055 (Jan. 19, 2005). The National Indian Gaming
Commission has also issued an opinion letter permitting the Osage Nation to conduct
gaming operations on fee lands in Tulsa, Oklahoma because they are within Osage County
and "lie within the Tribe's reservation." See Opening Brief of Appellant at 37-38 Osage




Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the area
has long since lost its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de facto,
if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred." 96  The Solem Court
provided the caveat that this is an "unorthodox and potentially unreliable
method of statutory interpretation."' 9 7
In its discussion of whether the Osage Allotment Act's post-enactment
history supports a finding of disestablishment, the Tenth Circuit considered
both Oklahoma's assertion of State jurisdiction over reservation territory and
a shift in Osage County's population demographics. The court of appeals
held that the assumption of jurisdiction in Osage County by county and state
officials favors disestablishment. It summarily stated that the "jurisdictional
history . . . demonstrates a practical acknowledgement that the Reservation
was diminished."' 9 8  The court also noted that Osage County's population
demographics rapidly shifted after the Osage Allotment Act's passage, and
that land ownership changed hands from tribal members to non-Indian
settlers, largely due to competency certificates issued by the Tribe's United
States Indian agent.199 This curt and dismissive discussion ignores that
assimilation efforts were well underway even before the Osage Allotment
Act's passage.2 00  Furthermore, changes in ownership of allotted Osage
Reservation lands simply should not be dispositive to the court's finding of
disestablishment because the individual and voluntary transfer of title to tribal
lands after the Osage Allotment Act went into effect is not a probative
indicator of congressional intent at the time the Act was signed into law. The
court of appeals treated the assumption of jurisdiction and a demographic
196. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984).
197. Id. at 472 n.13.
198. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1127 (alteration in original) (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399,
421 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id.
200. In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, Justice O'Connor recognized the prevalent
attitude of the day, noting that "[w]ithin a generation or two, it was thought, the tribes would
dissolve, their reservations would disappear, and individual Indians would be absorbed into
the larger community of white settlers." South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.
329, 335 (1998). The Osages did not easily fall to the assimilation influence. Well into the
1890s, the Osage Tribe clung to its traditional way of life. Many tribe members continued to
wear traditional Osage dress and continued to practice their native religion. But "[bly 1906
the traditional ceremonies had almost completely disappeared and most of the people were
making a conscious effort to forget the 'old way."' BAILEY, supra note 181, at 85. Author
Garrick Alan Bailey attributes the decline of the Osage culture to three major factors: a
shrinking population, economic changes, and pressure from federal Indian agents. Around
the time of allotment, the Osage Reservation saw an influx of white inhabitants. Soon, the
white reservation residents outnumbered the Osage population. Id.
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change (largely motivated by efforts to assimilate the tribes into mainstream
society) as "uncontested facts support[ing] disestablishment under [the third]
prong of the Solem test."20 1 The Tenth Circuit erred in this respect, placing
far more significance than it should on these "least compelling" factors. 202
In applying the Solem v. Bartlett framework's third prong to the principal
case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals placed far too much emphasis on
Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over Osage County and its population
demographics. The Tenth Circuit likewise failed to recognize - or even
consider - acts of Congress and other administrative agencies demonstrating
an understanding that the Osage Reservation has endured the Osage
Allotment Act of 1906. Along with its blatant disregard of evidence
supporting the Osage position under Solem's first (and most probative) prong,
the Irby court failed to engage in meaningful second-prong analysis, relying
almost exclusively on Solem's third (and least probative) prong. Not only did
the court of appeals depart markedly from Supreme Court precedent by
placing improper weight on demographic evidence, it did so with a myopic
disregard of equally compelling demographic evidence and congressional
action favoring the Tribe's position.
Rather than adhere to the Supreme Court's mandate in Solem, the Irby
court misapplied the relevant standard for finding diminishment or
disestablishment of a reservation, ignored the canons of construction, and
engaged in result-oriented judicial activism. To better effectuate federal trust
responsibilities in the era of tribal self-determination, courts should return to
a strict application of Solem's tripartite framework, placing the greatest
weight on the relevant act's statutory language, with due regard for the
canons of construction's requirements for resolution of statutory ambiguities
in the tribe's favor and for clear congressional intent to alter tribal property
rights.
IV Recommendations
The Osage Nation v. Irby opinion joins a line of authority that disregards
established federal Indian law precedent and refuses to observe the canons of
construction. With the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on June 27,
2011, the Irby opinion has unfortunately secured its position as poorly
decided Tenth Circuit precedent. Courts deciding questions of reservation
diminishment or disestablishment in the future should avoid the Tenth
201. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1126.




Circuit's flawed analysis and return to a faithful interpretation of the Solem v.
Bartlett test, guided by the canons of construction.
First, so long as Solem remains the test for ascertaining congressional
intent to diminish or disestablish an Indian reservation, courts must strictly
adhere to its analytical framework. In applying the Solem test, courts must
acknowledge that its three prongs are not to be weighed equally. The
evidence presented under those prongs should be accorded the weight
proportionally assigned to them by the Solem Court. The relevant act's plain
language purporting to affect reservation boundaries should be given the
greatest weight. Just as the presence of language clearly diminishing or
disestablishing a reservation would be highly determinative of congressional
intent, the absence of this language should receive comparable treatment.
Such language should be regarded as the foremost expression of
congressional purpose.
Second, when interpreting the relevant act's text affecting Indian land,
courts should closely follow the canons of construction. Where a statute's
language is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be construed in the light most
favorable to the tribe and in favor of the presumption of the reservation's
continued existence. Ambiguity might arise through either the inclusion of
conflicting textual provisions or the absence of language explicitly declaring
a reservation to be diminished or disestablished. To avoid continuing
encroachment on what little land remains in tribal hands today, courts must
take to heart the trust relationship between the federal government and the
tribes. The courts must also apply the canons of construction as a product of
that trust relationship. Courts must return to a policy of interpretation that
upholds and esteems these guiding principles of federal Indian law.
Third, where turning to the circumstances surrounding the passage of an
act alleged to have diminished or disestablished a reservation, courts must do
so only as a means of supplementing the language of the statute. Courts
should not use the circumstances surrounding passage as means of turning
ambiguous language against the tribes. In examining the context of such an
act, courts should pay special attention to the tribe's understanding of and
attitude toward the act. The courts should also note the presence of external
pressure from the federal government, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or the
area's non-Indian community. Where courts turn to an historical inquiry to
gauge congressional intent, the courts should remain cognizant of the
disparity in bargaining power between the federal government and the tribes
that contextualized many tribal agreements.
Finally, while courts may certainly examine the current demographic
population and land tenure of a disputed tract of land to better understand the
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modem context framing the issue of diminishment or disestablishment, this
Solem framework prong should be given minimal weight consistent with its
"third-tier" status. Post-hoc examination of ever-shifting demographics
simply cannot provide sufficient insight into congressional intent at the time
the statute or agreement was executed. Moreover, courts should not use the
modem-day effects of the now-decried allotment and assimilation policies to
hold against tribal interests.
V Conclusion
In Osage Nation v. Irby, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Osage Allotment Act of 1906 disestablished the Osage Reservation.
Although the Tenth Circuit correctly selected the Solem v. Bartlett test for
determining congressional intent to diminish or disestablish a reservation, the
court's application of the test is fraught with errors. The result is an unjust
decision.
The court of appeals entirely failed to heed the presumption in favor of the
continued existence of a reservation and to construe ambiguities in
congressional intent in favor of the tribe. In analyzing the Act's statutory
language, the court found the absence of language expressly terminating the
Osage Reservation "not unambiguous," despite references to the Reservation
that imply its continued existence, as well as additional factors supporting its
continued existence. In determining the contemporaneous understanding of
the Act, the court unquestioningly accepted the Tribe's "initiation" of an
allotment agreement as strong evidence of disestablishment. The court never
inquired into the Tribe's attitude during allotment or the hefty political price
with which allotment was paid.
Finally, in examining the history since the Act's passage, the court placed
far too much emphasis on the State's exercise of jurisdiction over Osage
County and the County's current population demographics, while ignoring
that numerous governmental agencies have recognized the Osage
Reservation's continuing existence. With its faulty analysis and utter
disregard of the canons of construction, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
stripped the Osage Nation of its crucial status as Indian Country, joining the
ranks of other government entities that have lusted after the Osage people's
tribal lands.
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